We summarise and evaluate Harris' criticisms of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) and the alternative processes he commends to health care decision makers. In contrast to CEA, Harris' asserts that individuals have a right to life-saving treatment that cannot be denied on the basis of their capacity to benefit. We conclude that, whilst Harris' work has challenged the proponents of CEA and quality-adjusted life years to be explicit about the method's indirect discriminatory characteristics, his arguments ignore important questions about what 'lives saved' mean. Harris also attempts to avoid opportunity cost by advocating the same chance of treatment for every person desiring treatment. Using a simple example, we illustrate that an 'equal chances' lottery is not in the interest of any patient, as it reduces the chance of treatment for all patients by leaving some of the health budget unspent.
Introduction
For the last 25 years, John Harris has been a highly vocal critic of the use of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) in health care resource allocation, and quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) in particular. As austerity bites and the attraction of methods that claim to support fair and transparent resource allocation inevitably increases, it is timely to re-consider Harris' arguments.
CEA assumes that the aim of health policy is to maximise population health. In its most common formulation, CEA measures health using QALYs in order to capture the impact of both life prolonging and life enhancing treatments. 1 Here, quality of life is measured on a scale where zero represents a state deemed (by a respondent) as bad as being dead, and one represents a state deemed as equivalent to being in full health. 2 If these 'anchors' are valued consistently across individuals, then the QALY can measure health between individuals in a comparable way. As QALYs can be formed for any conceivable treatment affecting health, they allow the health benefits from all treatments to be compared. This rhetoric of cost-effectiveness is used to justify its application by many decision makers around the world.
Our aim is to summarise and evaluate Harris' criticisms of CEA and the processes he commends to health care decision makers. We summarise Harris' general critique and the two general mechanisms that he recommends, before discussing difficulties in defining lives saved. In doing so, we critique a mechanism that saves the most lives possible, before illustrating that a lottery that provides each person with the same chance of obtaining treatment will be to the detriment of the worst off relative to available alternatives. Finally, we conclude by summarising the key themes in Harris' rejections of CEA and defend the use of CEA as a key source of efficiency information for decision makers.
Harris' general critique
What can count in decision making?
In QALY-based CEA, QALYs are used to compare any number of health treatments that differ in either their consequences for individuals or their costs. In contrast to this general case, Harris' critique of the QALY often posits specific situations where there is an imminent risk of death to at least one of a series of parties. 3 -7 Harris then typically compares the priority to be placed on different parties and highlights differences between rankings of cost-effectiveness (i.e. which treatments provide QALYs more efficiently) and his own intuitions.
Harris considers both the general priority between several people who face death 3,5 -10 and between those who face death and those who don't. 3, 6, 8, 11 Harris attempts to support two general propositions: that priority should be given to lifesaving treatments over those that are merely life enhancing, and that relatively few valid distinctions can be made between treatments for different individuals. As an example, Harris has argued that whilst each person might want the greatest possible health available to them (i.e. considering quality of life), 5, 11 he does not deem quality of life to be relevant when choosing between people. Similarly, Harris has also argued against the use of life expectancy/duration of benefit, 5,8 -10 costs of treatment, 9 and the chance of treatment success 6 when making decisions.
Harris has also criticised CEA for favouring the young, 7, 8 yet his own position is inconsistent on this point. When judging the importance of a lifesaving treatment he argues that those 'saved' cannot be too old, 3, 9 with only those below a critical age having an absolute claim to lifesaving treatment; those above the critical age have no such claim.
In contrast to most other characteristics of treatments, Harris argues that whether or not treatment affects survival matters, 3, 9 and he gives an automatic priority to treatments that save lives over those that enhance lives. As a result the most cost-effective life enhancing treatment receives less priority than the least cost-effective lifesaving treatment.
Where Harris denies the role of costs in decision making, there appears to be no mechanism for costcontainment within his proposals. If Harris' proposed system was established, many lifesaving treatments would be funded irrespective of their cost or health effects. This will include a large number of claims to treatment that would not be lodged in current systems. In the longer term, it is difficult to see much (or any) money being left for treatments that do not qualify as life-saving to those who Harris deems eligible. Here, Harris initial, compassionate intuitions would lead to a large increase in the number of "tragic" choices necessary between saving individual lives, and greatly reduced provision of treatments that do not meet Harris' requirements for priority.
Harris versus the cost of treatment
Harris' arguments vary as to whether costs might be considered in resource allocation, and so he does not necessarily present a single critique on this point. Harris' main argument is that the cost of a technology will influence the likelihood that CEA will recommend a treatment; by extension, this is said to discriminate against those patients whose conditions are relatively expensive to treat. 8 This type of reasoning needs to be carefully considered, as cost-effectiveness considers costs and effects: by disqualifying any meaningful consideration of treatment effectiveness (e.g. using duration or quality of life), it is Harris' own arguments that lead a warped version of CEA to focus on costs alone. In contrast, under CEA expensive treatments can be highly cost-effective if they also offer large improvements in health: it is the ratio of costs to effects that counts.
Any 'discrimination' remaining once costs and effects are considered together reflects not a bias in judgement but instead opportunity cost. With a fixed health budget -the only type of system that has the type of resource allocation problem that CEA can address -the true cost for one person is the health gain foregone for another. In this context, paying more for a given amount of health for one person compared to another person is itself discriminatory. Thus, providing treatment for those whose condition is relatively expensive to treat may be more discriminatory than not providing it. By linking health expenditures and health gains, CEA allows the explicit balancing of different claims on a limited health care budget. 12, 13 Harris has previously acknowledged that there remain questions about how to distribute health care between different claims to health resources, and how to deal with what he refers to as 'resource guzzlers' whose treatments are especially expensive to treat. 4, 9 Whilst he has indicated that the problems of these patients lie outside the scope of his contributions to this debate, these cases pose a real challenge for resource allocation. By definition, the prevalence of expensive, rare conditions is low but a large number of these conditions exist. The net effect is that a large number of 'resource guzzlers' potentially exist and a key part of whether a critique is useful is how these cases are dealt with. On this point, Harris critique appears both silent and unhelpful.
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Mechanisms for decision making
If the number of people demanding treatment is high enough, then a clear mechanism is required to choose between the lodged claims for treatment. To this end, Harris appears to recommend two different mechanisms within his main propositions. Harris has proposed maximising both the number of lives saved 8 and a lottery treating individual patients that gives each person an equal chance of benefitting from a lifesaving treatment. 4, 6, 9, 11, 14 Where limited budgets would mean that difficult choices need to be made, Harris' clear view is that the health budget should increase to avoid having to make choices between people. 8, 11 What is a life saved?
Regardless of whether we are concerned with maximising lives saved or giving each person the same chance of treatment, Harris' argument allows very little evidence on which to base resource allocation decisions. On this basis, it appears that Harris' argument oversimplifies health so that patients are simply alive or dead at an unspecified point in time following treatment or nontreatment (depending on the choices made).
Ultimately though, everyone dies and, once dead, their life is no longer "saved", even if this could have been said -albeit imprecisely -at some time. So this raises the semantic question of whether and when it is appropriate to even talk about "saving" life. For his part, Harris appears to deem even a few hours sufficient if this is important to the patient. 3, 7 Whilst this caveat is necessary to avoid criticisms that "saving lives" might equate to "prolonging misery", it is not sufficient for a robust resource allocation system. Critically, this does not appear to lend itself to a clear measure of whether or not a health care system provides value across society as a whole.
If what matters from an ethical point of view is "saving" lives, then the measure of success for a health care system is the number of lives it has saved. If so, then a baby saved who would live for 70 years will represent a success to that system for longer than another baby saved for just a day. Thus, even a health system that aims to have "saved" as many lives as possible might still prioritise treating those with greater life expectancies. Harris' focus on ad hoc examples, rather than a robust mechanism for allocating resources, appears to weaken his conclusions.
A second key question is: how imminently must a life be in jeopardy for it to be deemed "saved"? Whilst Harris' examples imagine an imminent and instant death following denial of treatment, in the vast majority of real world situations death is not instantaneous where treatment is denied. Here, either Harris' position can be generalised, or it deals only with a tiny number of exceptional cases involving imminent and instant death, and so has nothing to say in the vast majority of places where QALYs are used.
What would a generalisation involve? Whilst Harris has claimed that "real and present dangers should be met before future and speculative ones", 11 he appears to have defined neither presence nor reality -and a substantive critique requires this clarity if it is to inform decision making. Even if there is a distinct value to urgency, 15 it becomes increasingly difficult to justify equal claims on the health care budget as we consider longer intervals for mortality risks. However, uncomfortable questions over what does and does not constitute lifesaving are inevitable once clarity is provided: a clear distinction between a risk of death today and one in 10 years' time might be valid, but another between risk today and risk tomorrow seems problematic. Any limit on when jeopardy must occur means that Harris places lexically greater priority on only some life preserving treatments, and absolute limits on which life preserving treatments "count" will appear arbitrary and themselves attract criticism.
Elsewhere, Harris acknowledges a relationship between life enhancing treatments and the protection of life; e.g. through screening, prevention and "first line" treatments of disease. 9 He recognises the complexity of the choices to be made and that decision makers considering these issues would need to consider issues such as pain, distress and mobility; thus he accepts the moral legitimacy of considering life enhancing aspects of health care. However, he rejects the QALY, in part because it incorporates life expectancy. As we explain above, this rejection of life expectancy flows from the fact that he only considers outcomes at a single point in time (e.g. life saved/life not saved) without fully exploring issues of timing. Once these timing issues are considered, then objections to the use of duration are significantly weakened, as is Harris' emphasis on life saving treatments.
If we largely discount Harris' dismissal of life expectancy (duration of benefit) and consider lifesaving treatments alongside life enhancing ones, then we have moved a long way towards QALY maximisation. In this case, much of Harris' critique is lost.
Harris' treatment lottery -a 'Rawlsian' solution?
In practice, resource allocation occurs in a context in which both efficiency and justice exert some pressure but neither is likely to be definitive in isolation. 16, 17 Those reimbursement authorities that use QALYs to inform their decisions frequently incorporate other criteria into their decision making; for example the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) has identified social value judgements that it takes into account alongside cost-effectiveness information. 18 In its criteria for end of life care, NICE explicitly accepts less cost-effective treatments under some circumstances where lives might be saved. Unfortunately, Harris appears to interpret NICE's use of CEA information within its processes as if its processes were solely determined by CEA information. As such, there is a concern that he employs 'NICE' as a strawman in his arguments. Indeed, if we start incorporating information about treatment duration and quality of life in decision making, Harris 'lives saved maximisation' mechanism starts looking very like CEA as used in practice.
However, where Harris' recommends a treatment lottery there seems to be a large gap between his stance and any conceivable version of CEA. In part, this is because he has asserted that each person should receive the same chance at treatment. Here, Harris asserts potentially the most important feature of a lottery is that it "values each person at one and none at more than one." 9 He has justified this stance using 'Rawlsian' reasoning 9, 19, 20 that suggests a patient would not select QALY maximisation from within a veil of ignorance because it would represent too large a risk should they be old/unhealthy once the veil is lifted.
Harris' argument appears slightly different to that presented by Rawls 21 when this veil was introduced. Rawls 21 classified health as a 'natural primary good' alongside others such as vigour, intelligence, and imagination. These are distinguished from the social primary goods (rights, liberties, opportunities, income and wealth) on the basis that whilst the natural primary goods can be influenced by the structure of society, they are not directly under its control. From here, Rawls distributes the social primary goods only, and distributes these so that any inequality must work to the benefit of the most disadvantaged group in society. Critically, Rawls stated that this principles allocate only social primary goods, and only apply to cases where all citizens have physical and psychological capacities within a certain normal range. 22 As Rawls' veil is built up from first principles as a hypothetical device, it is not trivial to predict which principles it would produce with a different starting point, including where natural primary goods are allocated. Harris begs this question by simply applying a 'Rawlsian' solution to a very different problem and so again ignores the problem of 'resource guzzlers'.
A number of commentators have debated both Rawls' difference principle 23, 24 and Harris' view of lotteries, 16 ,25,26 and we do not have scope to cover these contributions here. We note however that Harris' argument is somewhat stronger than Rawls' -both in terms of his wider application of 'Rawlsian' reasoning and his requirement that all people receive the same chance of treatment. We show with a simple example that an equal chances lottery does not satisfy the difference principle, and so obtains no 'Rawlsian' support even if an extension of Rawls' framework to health is valid.
Suppose the budget for health care is fixed at a level where some patients claiming treatment will be denied it. If costs differ between people, then there will be a general trade-off between funding expensive and cheaper treatments, or between treating patients requesting more expensive and less expensive treatments. CEA focuses on the former question, with Harris focussing on the latter.
Where the whole budget is spent, the number of patients 'drawn' by a lottery will depend on which patients are selected. When we select expensive patients, fewer individual treatments can be afforded. Clearly, those requiring less expensive treatments will have a higher likelihood of receiving it, as their treatment is more likely to be affordable when their number is 'drawn' and they become a candidate. This can only be avoided where the number of 'draws' is restricted.
A lottery in which each person has the same chance of receiving treatment corresponds to one particular mechanism. In this case, the lottery 'draws' a predefined number of 'patients' who receive treatment, where this number is defined so that it is always possible to accommodate treatment for this number of patients within the available budget. The mechanism does this -and avoids the general trade-off between expensive and cheaper treatments -by leaving some of the budget unspent.
We illustrate this with a stylistic example in which £120k is available to fund health care for patients receiving one of six treatments that are assumed to have the same health effect for each recipient. The costs to treat each patient of 100 patients in Groups A, B, C, D and E are, respectively £100, £100, £200, £500 and £1000. Group F comprises one patient whose treatment costs £100k, so that there are a total of 501 individuals. All patients are assumed to be identical without treatment, so that the 'worst off' is synonymous with those having the lowest chance of treatment.
We consider four mechanisms that provide solutions with an increasing focus on efficiency. † Equal chances lottery † Full eligibility lottery: selects from all patients, and stops once a treatment is drawn that cannot be afforded † Limited eligibility lottery: selects from only those patients whose treatment is feasible † Cost-effectiveness: maximises the number of patients to be treated Table 1 then Treatment F would be selected for one patient (£100k) and Treatment E would be selected for 20 patients (20Â£1k). Thus, a lottery requiring equal chances can only select 21 people for treatment, so that all 501 patients face a 4.2% (21/501) chance of treatment. On average, only 10% of the available budget will be spent in this case.
Where the equal chance requirement is relaxed, and we select treatments only until an infeasible lottery is selected, those patients potentially receiving Treatments A-E have around a 44% chance of treatment, whilst the sole patient in Treatment F has only a 10% chance of treatment. On average, only 78% of the available budget is spent here, as allocation stops once it is infeasible to treat a drawn patient.
Relaxing the equality requirement further, the budget could be spent on feasible treatments until it is exhausted. This would not benefit those whose treatment becomes infeasible, but may benefit others whose treatment remains feasible. Within our simulated lotteries, the patient in Treatment F has an 11% chance of treatment but patients awaiting Treatments A-E now face chances of 57 -58%; there is only a marginally greater chance of treatment for the worst off. Finally, the cost-effective solution involves treating all patients standing to benefit from Treatments A -D, and 30% of patients in Treatment E. Overall, 86% of patients receive treatment and the entire available budget is spent.
Clearly, each of the lotteries involves a significant drop in aggregate health outcomes when compared to the cost-effective solution. We acknowledge that given the choice, some may well prefer the outcome from one of the lotteries to that of cost-effectiveness. Within the lotteries considered here, the most unequal lottery (limited eligibility lottery) appears the most justifiable. It seems very unlikely that many would choose an equalchance lottery as the worst off group loses some probability of treatment, as there may still be sufficient funds to afford their treatment when the equal chances lottery has finished drawing its patients. The equal chances lottery thus violates Rawls' difference principle that all inequalities should be to the benefit of the worst off group. On a 'Rawlsian' basis, the idea of a lottery giving the same chance of treatment to all people appears unjustifiable.
Harris' proposals for a just system of resource allocation, even with the limited detail he provides, can be shown not to be practical and, indeed, to be both less just (according to the difference principle) and less efficient than some close alternatives available. Whilst potentially robust alternatives to a strictly-applied CEA exist, Harris' lottery mechanism is not among them.
As health care systems typically consider both CEA and equity considerations together, it is arguable that the appropriate questions for analysis relate to how systems might justly trade-off more equal outcomes and more efficient outcomes, than to whether CEAas an important element of an existing system -is just.
Summary and conclusion
Harris' critiques of the use of CEA and QALYs for resource allocation have challenged their proponents to be explicit about the methods' discriminatory characteristics and have thus contributed to an improved understanding within policy and academic communities of their strengths and weaknesses. In this paper we have attempted to challenge his arguments in a similar way.
In any attempt to deal with totality of a critique as long-lived as Harris', we acknowledge that we risk misinterpreting his stance and missing any errors that he has acknowledged and responded to in his own reasoning. Given the risk of variation in his position over time, we cannot fully dismiss this possibility. We have, however, attempted to provide a clear summary of his position and respond to it.
Harris' basic position is that all individuals have a right to treatment that cannot be denied by a decision maker on the basis of their ability to benefit. Harris has recommended different methods of allocation: a lottery in which each individual is provided with the same chance of obtaining lifesaving treatment (or the same chance of obtaining the greatest possible health benefit to them); and the maximisation of lives saved.
Where Harris argues for the maximisation of lives saved, we would argue that much more clarity is needed about what this means and who qualifies for Ã Based on 10,000 random draws from the lottery Costs: A £100, B £100, C £200, D £500, E £1000, F £100,000
lifesaving treatment. As it stands, Harris' disqualification of life expectancy and his absolute advocacy of life saving treatments over life enhancing ones remain untenable. Once this is modified, and quality of life is considered to allow life enhancing treatments to have a value, we are left with something that is very similar to existing arguments for equity that appear alongside CEA in decision makers' deliberations. After 25 years, Harris' critique appears artificial. Further it is probably now unhelpful, since a modified critique offers little to existing systems of decision making. Larger problems exist, though, where Harris suggests that all people ought to receive the same chance of treatment. In these cases, Harris arguments appear to be more seriously flawed. Whilst Harris seeks to sidestep issues of opportunity cost, he can only do so by denying at least some chance of treatment to all parties. A modified lottery for treatment claims can be considered but there are still many serious unanswered questions about the costs and acceptability of lotteries: of defining and enforcing their terms, of identifying the total costs from treating an individual (which is harder than doing the same for a group), and the problem of scaling treatments (the first treatment given to one person might be more expensive than subsequent treatments). After all of this, it would then need to be decided whether their consequences are acceptable in terms of an efficiency -equity trade-off. No discussion of these issues can be complete, however, without first having a fuller account of what to do about those who are especially expensive to treat. The concerns we have raised suggest that these groups represents a serious challenge to his argument.
Whilst we have presented only a stylised example, it is clear that the existence of differences in the costs of treatments mean that an equal chance lottery must leave some of the health budget unspent. It seems very unlikely that it could be deemed ethical, or even beneficial to the worst off, to deny treatment to some on the basis that potential treatment is not available to all. This, however, is exactly what Harris' equal chance lottery requires and why Harris' critique is ultimately undone.
